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This Article analyzes Australia's legal obligations under a range of
international conventions and treaties concerned with aerial hijacking
and terrorism. In reviewing recent incidents of aerial hijacking in Aus-
tralia, the Article notes the trend in damages awarded to victims and
relatives in the United States during 1996 following the decisions of
Zicherman v. Korean Airlines Co.,1 Bickel v. Korean Air Lines
Co.,2 and Pescatore v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.' As the
Sydney 2000 Olympics approach, should airlines entering Australia expe-
rience similar incidents of terrorist attacks on aircraft, either in the air or
on the ground, international insurance companies may well face finan-
cial ruin, unable to meet many of the claims for damages by the families
of the deceased victims, as witnessed by some insurers in the United States.
The Article concludes with the view that while Australia may potentially
face an increase in incidents associated with aerial terrorism and hi-
jacking as the millennium approaches, the opportunities for such inci-
dents ought largely be nullified by the Australian ftderal government's
current security and operational strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
K INCIDENT on November 25, 1996, involving Flight ET
1 6te dIvoire 961 en route from Addis Abbaba, Ethiopia, to
Abyan, when hijackers demanded the plane fly to Australia,4
highlights the potential vulnerability of Australia's aerial secur-
ity. Given that Australia will host the Sydney 2000 Olympics,
such incursions from abroad at this time raise concerns. Only
four previous incidents involving aerial terrorism have occurred
in Australia's aviation history. The first occurred in 1971 when
Peter Macari, posing as "Mr. Brown," threatened to activate a
bomb aboard a Qantas flight from Sydney to Hong Kong.5 He
was subsequently convicted of the criminal offence of extortion
against Qantas and jailed for fifteen years. The second incident,
in 1981, was aboard a flight from Sydney to Brisbane; a de-
ranged passenger attempted to take over the plane,6 produced a
loaded, sawed-off shotgun and threatened the crew of a DC 9
carrying forty-one passengers. The aircraft was forced to fly on
an unauthorized flight path and at an unauthorized altitude.7
1 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
2 96 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 1996).
3 97 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1996).
4 See Hijackers Wielded Axe, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 25, 1996, at 1.
5 See Internet "Led to Qantas Bomb Threat," SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,July 7, 1997,
at 3.
6 See L.R. Edwards, R. v. Silley 1981-A Further Note, 6 AIR L. 96 (1981).
7 See id.
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The aircraft eventually landed without harm to the lives of the
passengers, crew, and people on the ground.' The third inci-
dent occurred on November 10, 1995, at Sydney International
Airport,9 and the fourth incident occurred on July 4, 1997. In
this latest incident a seventeen-year-old youth, using a similar
alias to the convicted offender Macari in 1971, adopted the alias
"Mr. Brown" and informed Qantas Airways officials that he had
planted a device on board Qantas Flight 27, en route from Syd-
ney to Hong Kong that would be triggered to detonate a bomb
on board the aircraft unless he received $505,000 (Australian)
in cash.10
Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) is assess-
ing the likelihood of terrorist incursions into Australia as well as
possible insurrection from dissident groups within the coun-
try.1' These issues will be discussed later in this Article. 12 The
World Travel and Tourism Council predicts that air passenger
traffic will grow worldwide between 5.1 percent and 5.7 percent
between 1997 and 2000.1 At the same time, export earnings
from Australian tourism in 1995 generated $13.1 billion (an in-
crease of 17.2 percent from 1994), accounting for 12.6 percent
of Australia's total export earnings and 62.2 percent of its total
services exports. By 2000, gross export earnings from tourism
are estimated to rise to approximately $21 billion. In 1995, over
3.7 million international visitors came to Australia. In the year
2000, some 6.3 million people are expected to visit this country,
providing consequential economic benefits to the nation.' 4 As
the Sydney 2000 Olympics approach, there are serious concerns
8 See id.
9 See Amanda Meade, Greece, Canada Set to Grant Ethiopian Hijacker Asylum, Aus-
TRALIAN, Dec. 18-19, 1995, at 10.
10 See Internet "Led to Qantas Bomb Threat', supra note 5, at 3.
11 See David Lague, ASIO Warns of Olympic Terrorism, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Nov. 2, 1995, at 15. See also Dennis Shanahan, Ruddock Pushes After Ervin Jumps,
WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, July 26-27, 1997, at 5 (describing the recent incident when
the Australian Minister for Immigration deported Lorenzo Ervin, an aging Black
Panther who had been in Australia on a lecture tour. The minister cancelled
Ervins's visa on the grounds that he was not of good character for the purposes of
Section 501 of the Migration Act as he had been previously convicted for aerial
skyjacking and kidnapping, although he received Presidential clemency for his
convictions some years ago.
12 See infra Part V.
13 See Air Transport and Free World Trade, in WORLD TRAVEL AND TOURISM COUN-
CIL 3 (1997).
14 See Australian Tourism-Facts and Figures (visited Jan. 8, 1997) <http://
www.tourism.gov.au>.
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for the international safety and security of travellers as well as
the potential for damage to Australia's tourism industry.
This Article therefore seeks to define aerial terrorism and hi-
jacking and to examine the international regime of laws gov-
erning such matters. In doing so, it describes the range of
conventions, declarations, and protocols that regulate and,
where possible, reduce incidents of aerial terrorism. The Con-
ventions include: the Warsaw Convention (1929), the Tokyo
Convention (1963), the Hague Convention (1970), the Mon-
treal Convention (1971), the European Convention (1977), the
Bonn Declaration (1978), the International Convention Against
the Taking of Hostages (1979), the Montreal Protocol (1984),
and the Montreal Protocol (1988). This Article will assess some
recent incidents involving aerial terrorism and hijacking, noting
that terrorism has declined sharply in the last decade, from a
peak of 665 incidents in 1987 to 296 in 1996, a twenty-five year
low.'" Nevertheless, the overall threat of terrorism remains seri-
ous. Despite greater sophistication in vigilance and security
techniques employed by airlines and at international airports,
aerial terrorist attacks persist.'6
Finally, the Article will discuss recent trends in litigation in-
volving aerial disasters, including the 1983 Korean Airlines
Flight 007 disaster with the loss of 269 lives and the Lockerbie
Disaster in 1988 when 259 lives were lost. Both incidents cre-
ated substantial claims for damages by the families of deceased
victims in United States courts. The cases, Zicherman v. Korean
Air Lines, Co., 7 Bickel v. Korean Air Lines, Co.,"8 and Pescatore v.
15 Between 1949 and 1985, there were 1539 persons killed in 87 registered
bombings and explosions on aircraft. In the period from 1970 to 1979, criminal
acts against civil aviation resulted in 1255 deaths, 1013 wounded, and 33,097 per-
sons taken hostage. Between 1980 and 1985, there were 123 incidents of hi-
jacking and 80 attempted hijackings. See Henrik Gam, Liability DamagesforInjuries
Sustained by Passengers in the Event of Hijacking of Aircraft and Other Violations of
Aviation Security, LLOYDS MARITIME & COM. L. Q., May 1988, at 217 n.1. See also
United States Dept. of State, 1996 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report (visited Feb. 1,
1998) <http://www.state.gov/global/terrorism/1996report/1996index.html>.
16 See generally Perry S. Bechky, Management and Misrepresentation: U.S. Judicial
Implementation of the Warsaw Convention in Air Disaster Litigation, 60 J. AIR L. &
COM. 455, 457 n.6 (1995). Pan Am, having declared bankruptcy, will have to look
to its insurers to pay the awards. See Ronald Sullivan, Court Upholds Pan Am 103
Awards, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1994, at D2. The bankruptcy also further complicates
the litigation. See Murray v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 16 F.3d 513 (2d Cir.
1994).
17 516 U.S. 217 (1996). Zicherman arose when KAL flight 007, en route from
Anchorage, Alaska, to Seoul, South Korea, strayed into air space of the Soviet
734
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Union and was shot down by Soviet military aircraft over the Sea ofJapan, result-
ing in the deaths of 269 passengers and crew. The mother and sister of a de-
ceased passenger brought suit. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $161,000 for
survivors' grief damages, $16,000 to Zicherman (the decedent's sister) for loss of
support and inheritance, and $100,000 to Zicherman for the decedent's pain and
suffering. In addition, the jury awarded $50 million for punitive damages against
KAL, as the flight crew was held to be in breach of Article 25 for wilful miscon-
duct, thus lifting the $75,000 damages cap.
On appeal, the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld the finding of wilful misconduct
on the part of the airline, but dismissed the claim for punitive damages, on the
grounds that the Warsaw Convention does not permit such a claim. See id. at 219-
20.
Also at the damages trial, KAL argued that the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA) applied, which did not permit damages for loss of society. On appeal,
relying on the earlier decision of Lockerbie II, the court held that general maritime
law governed and permitted loss of society damages but only if the plaintiff was a
dependent of the decedent at the time of death. See id. at 220-21. The court
remanded to the district court for determination of whether Zicherman was a
dependent of the decedent. See id. at 221.
The court also concluded that Articles 17 and 24, which permit compensation
only for legally cognizable harm, but leave the specification of what harm is le-
gally cognizable to the domestic law, were applicable under choice-of-law rules.
Because the airplane crash occurred in international waters, DOHSA supplied
the substantive law; because DOHSA permits direct financial damages only, the
plaintiffs were not entitled to recover for loss of society damages. See id. at 231.
18 96 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 1996). In Bickel, the decedent's estate claimed dam-
ages based upon the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, namely that, for
"the twelve minute descent into the Sea of Japan, [the decedent] suffer[ed] the
physical effects of decompression and recompression along the way as well as the
horror of knowing that death was imminent." Id. at 155.
The district court had awarded varying sums of $400,000, $1,350,000, and
$1,000,000, and was supported by sufficient evidence in actions brought under
the Warsaw Convention. See id. at 156. KAL argued that the Supreme Court's
decision in Zicherman intervened and changed the law on the availability of pre-
death pain and suffering damages. The court disagreed, noting that Zicherman
did not address the propriety of the predeath pain and suffering damages
awarded at the trial in that case and pointed out the Zicherman award was left to
stand. See id. at 153.
The court of appeals initially reversed the pre-death pain and suffering awards.
On rehearing, the court let the awards stand, finding KAL had waived the issue.
See id. at 153. The court further held that Zicherman does not address the priority
of the pre-death pain and suffering damages awarded at trial in that case, and the
award stands to this day. See id.
The Zicherman decision neither added to nor changed the law regarding the
availability of nonpecuniary damages under DOHSA. See id. at 153. The court
stated, "Thus any argument that KAL could make based on the fact that DOHSA
does not allow nonpecuniary damages was available to it before the Court de-
cided Zicherman, and therefore KAL could have raised this issue in its opening
briefs." Id. Furthermore, the court noted that "[t]he argument that pre-death
pain and suffering damages are not available if DOHSA applies has been raised
numerous times before Zicherman." Id. at 154.
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Pan American World Airways, Inc.,' 9 were recently before the ap-
pellate courts, and in the case of Zicherman, the Supreme Court
of the United States in September 1996.20
One of the most recent cases of aviation disaster, resulting in
the loss of 230 lives, occurred on July 17, 1996, when TWA Flight
800 exploded and crashed into the sea over the coast of Long
Island, New York, shortly after its departure from New York's
JFK International Airport.2'
More than twenty family members have appeared before the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) in an attempt to have the law
Judge Batchelder, in a dissenting opinion, stated that "DOHSA ... governs
exclusively; it provides the sole source of damages recoverable and permits only
pecuniary damages." Id. at 157. He remarked that Zicherman constitutes an insu-
perable obstacle to an award of pain and suffering damages-clearly non-pecuniary
damages in these cases. Moreover, he contended that "there is no basis in the law
for the pre-death pain and suffering awards which today's majority upholds." Id.
at 159.
However, where wilful misconduct can be proven against the carrier, the limi-
tation does not apply.
19 97 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1996). On December 21, 1988, a bomb in a suitcase
exploded aboard PAN AM flight 103, causing the aircraft to explode over Lock-
erbie, Scotland. All 243 passengers and 16 crew members died. The families and
relatives of the deceased brought wrongful death actions under Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention against Pan Am. Recovery of damages is generally limited to
$75,000, as set out in airline passenger tickets pursuant to Article 17 of the War-
saw Convention.
Pescatore arose as a result of the facts surrounding the Lockerbie disaster. A
deceased's wife brought suit claiming damages under the Warsaw Convention
under Article 17 and Article 25, the wilful misconduct provision. Under the
choice of law rules, the substantive law to be applied was that of Ohio, the state
with the greatest interest in the litigation. See id. at 14.
Before a jury trial in New York, the jury awarded roughly $19,000,000. The
award consisted of:
(1) $9,000,000 for loss of past and future financial support;
(2) $5,000,000 for loss of society, companionship, love, and affection, past and
future; and
(3) $5,045,000 in net prejudgment interest. See id. at 18-20.
The Second Circuit held that
Zicherman embodies an intervening change of controlling law by
holding that the Warsaw convention does not require imposition of
a uniform federal rule of damages . . . [thus] we are compelled to
alter the law of this case .... [T] he law governing damages is deter-
mined by reference to the relevant sovereign's law, not federal
common law.
Id. at 12.
20 See Pescatore, 97 F.3d at 4.
21 See Alan Attwood, Test Plane Retraces Flight to Disaster, SYDNEY MORNING HER-
ALD, July 16, 1997, at 11.
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changed that presently limits their ability to sue over the crash.22
The parties sought an amendment to DOHSA, which does not
allow families to claim punitive damages in aviation disasters
more than three miles offshore. Flight 800 was 10 miles off East
Moriches, New York, when it crashed.23 The statute only allows
families to seek compensation in lawsuits against the manufac-
turer and airline for loss of support if the deceased was a bread-
winner. The inquiry is continuing at the time of writing.24
If similar claims are successful, they are likely to drive the asso-
ciated airlines and their insurers into bankruptcy. These events
signal concern for Australian carriers and insurers. Australia
may be faced with similar litigation in the future given its pro-
pensity to follow litigation trends in the United States.
This Article concludes with the view that despite Australia's
relative geographical isolation from the rest of the world, in-
creased security measures will be necessary to protect passengers
and airlines, especially during the weeks leading up to the Syd-
ney 2000 Olympics.
II. AERIAL TERRORISM
The term "terrorism" can be defined as "an act of political
violence directed at targets which have symbolic value aimed at
influencing potential decision-making through fear and intimi-
dation. 1 5 In attempting to find an effective definition of terror-
ism, "one person's terrorist is another's patriot or freedom
fighter. 26
Gerald Fitzgerald states that there are many definitions of ter-
rorism, citing the statement of former President George Bush in
1986 that terrorism is "the unlawful use or threat of violence
against persons or property to further political or social objec-
tives. It is usually intended to intimidate or coerce a govern-
22 See Lauren Terrazzano, Families Plea for Compo Change, SYDNEY MORNING HER-
ALD, July 12, 1997, at 31.
23 See id. at 31.
24 See id.
25 George Borkowski, Use of Force: Interception of Aircraft, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J.
761, 762 n.12 (1986).
26 Id. But see Louis R. Beres, The Meaning of Terrorism-Jurisprudential and Defi-
nitional Clarifications, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239, 241 (1995) (criticizing this
definition).
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ment, individuals, or groups or to modify their behavior or
policies. 2
7
Crenshaw, on the other hand, observes that "[t]errorism by
definition requires an audience. It is violence performed for ef-
fect, to communicate a threat and to demonstrate a point not
just to the government but to the public. Its power is
psychological." 28
The term "aerial terrorism" limits the discussion of terrorism
to incidents associated with aircraft in the air or on the ground.
It also includes attacks on air terminal facilities. Aerial terror-
ism, therefore, is distinct from other types of terrorism, such as
terrorist attacks on foreign embassies, legations, government, or
airline offices.
The expression "hijack," according to Borkowski, is somewhat
problematic.29 Its original meaning, at least in the United
States, is derived from the Prohibition of Alcohol era in the
1920-1930s, when the term referred to the seizure of a private
commercial vehicle or vessel with the intent of theft of its load
or cargo." Borkowski adopts the United States Federal Aviation
Act's definition referring to "any seizure or exercise of control
by force or violence or threat of force or violence and with
wrongful intent of an aircraft in flight in air commerce."31
Aerial hijacking and terrorist incidents between 1949 and
1985 serve to illustrate the severity of this problem. In that time
period, 1539 persons were killed in 87 registered bomb explo-
sions on aircraft. Furthermore, airline passengers endured 498
hijackings and 281 attempted hijackings. 2
More specific incidents include a July 4, 1997, Qantas Flight
traveling from Sydney to Hong Kong with 95 passengers and
27 L.L. Green, International Law and the Control of Terrorism, 7 DALHOUSIE LJ.
236, 239 (1983). The term "terror" seems to have French origins. It gave conno-
tations of criminality to one's conduct and was explicitly identified with the reign
of terror during the French Revolution. See id. In Abeyratne's view, it is consid-
ered a system of coercive intimidation brought about by the infliction of terror or
fear. See R.I.R. Abeyratne, The Effects on Unlawful Interference of Civil Aviation on
World Peace and the Social Order, 22 TRANSP. L.J. 449 (1995) (quoting A.H. MILLER,
TERRORISM AND HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS 10-11 (1980)).
28 Martha Crenshaw, The Counter-Terrorism/Terrorism Dynamic, in TERRORISM AND
THE 2000 OLYMPICS 121, 124 (Alan Thompson ed., 1996).




32 See Gam, supra note 15, at 217.
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crew, during which terrorists threatened to detonate a device on
board if they did not receive a ransom of $505,000. In June,
1997, an Air Malta Flight bound for Turkey was diverted to Ger-
many." On March 11, 1997, on Taiwanese Flight FEAT 128,
with 150 passengers and six crew members, a Taiwanese journal-
ist doused himself with gasoline and demanded the plane be
diverted to Kaiohsing on the Chinese mainland, where he was
subsequently arrested by local police. 4 Moreover, in November
1996, on Flight ET 961, en route from Addis Abbaba, Ethiopia,
to the Ivory Coast, three hijackers, one wielding an ax, de-
manded that the pilot fly the plane to Australia because the hi-
jackers wanted to make history."5 The plane ran out of fuel
approaching the Comoros Islands near Madagascar and crashed
into the sea, resulting in 123 deaths.
In October, 1996, a German court sentenced a Turkish male
to a seven-year jail term for hijacking an aircraft with a toy pistol
in order to draw attention to the plight of Muslims in Chechnya.
The flight's path was originally from Cyprus to Munich. The
hijacker released 108 hostages after police promised him access
to a radio reporter and a lawyer.36
In November, 1995, on Olympic Flight 472 from Sydney Inter-
national Airport, which was carrying 110 passengers and bound
for Athens, an Ethiopian journalist, who had travelled to Austra-
lia from Greece six months earlier on a false passport,
threatened a steward with a knife minutes before the flight left
the tarmac, demanding the Greek government grant him
sanctuary.
III. THE WARSAW CONVENTION (1929)38
Australia is a signatory to the international convention gov-
erning the safety of passengers, known as the Warsaw Conven-
tion. Article 17 of the Convention provides that the liability of
3 See Hijackers to Make Statement of Solidarity for Man Who Shot Pope, L.A. TIMES,
June 10, 1997, at A4.
34 See Taiwan Journalist Hijacks Plane, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 11, 1997,
at 8.
35 See Hijackers Wielded Axe, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 25, 1996, at 1.
36 See Hijack Bid Fails on Plane Out of Sydney, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 10,
1995, at 3.
37 See Hijacker Feared A Firing Squad, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 11, 1995, at
1.
38 Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (codified at
49 U.S.C. § 40105 (1996)) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. The Convention
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air carriers is for the safety of passengers "on board the aircraft
or in the course of any of the operations of embarking and dis-
embarking. '39 The Warsaw Convention is limited in its scope,
providing rights to passengers seeking damages for personal in-
juries against air carriers. It offers absolute liability for a fixed
and limited award of damages. It is civil in nature, not criminal.
Thus, it does not seek to punish offenders with criminal sanc-
tions. This is a matter for the Tokyo Convention (1963) and
other related conventions.
IV. THE CONVENTIONS AGAINST TERRORISM
AND HIJACKING
The group of Conventions and Protocols associated with ae-
rial hijacking and terrorism have been fully described else-
where4' by a number of learned authors including Gerald F.
Fitzgerald and Paul S. Dempsey. 4' The following is a summary
of the main principles.
A. THE ToICvo CONVENTION (1963)42
The first international legal instruments governing terrorism
and hijacking were developed by the International Civil Aviation
Organization in 1963."3 This was a response to the large
has been adopted as Australian Law under the Civil Aviation Carriers' Liability
Act (1959).
39 Warsaw Convention, supra note 38, art. 17. It further provides that:
[t] he carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suf-
fered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking.
Article 25 similarly provides that:
[t]he carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions
of this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage
is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part...
is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct.
Id. art. 25.
40 See Gerald F. Fitzgerald, Towards Legal Suppression of Acts Against Civil Avia-
tion, Nov. 1971, No. 585, 42-82; Gerald F. Fitzgerald, Unlawful Interference with Civil
Aviation, in EssAys IN AIR LAW 59, 60-63. (Arnold Kean ed., 1982).
41 See Paul S. Dempsey, Aerial Piracy and Terrorism: Unilateral and Multilateral
Responses to Aircraft Hijacking, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 427 (1987).
42 Convention on Offenses & Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept.
14, 1963, 204 U.S.T. 1641, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Tokyo Convention].
43 The Convention was ratified by 49 states within one year. By 1969, 86 states
had ratified it. The Convention deals with crimes on board civil aircraft and also
gives extra territorial jurisdiction-the right to seek out offenders and return
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number of aerial hijacking and acts of terrorism aboard aircraft
during the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in Northern Europe
and the Middle East.44 Dempsey reports that while there were
hijackings as early as the 1930s and 1940s, modern commercial
air travel terrorism really began in the period 1948-1960 when
there were twenty-nine successful hijackings worldwide. In the
following six years (1961-1967), there were a total of sixteen
hijackings. In 1960, there were thirty successful hijackings of
aircraft, seventeen with United States registration.45
The motives for aerial hijacking during this early period were
mixed. In some incidents, political refugees sought a safe ha-
ven. This was so in a number of hijackings involving Cuban
6migr~s attempting to enter the United States or by dissidents in
the United States wishing to return to Cuba. Dempsey describes
them as "the actions of unbalanced individuals seeking an outlet
for frustration and repression. "46 The aerial hijackings in the
post-Cold War period through to the 1980s were made in an
attempt to promote political objectives relating to existing inter-
national conflict between nations. The conflict between Israel
and the Arab states that began in 1946 in the Middle East follow-
ing the end of the Second World War continues to the present
time.
The Tokyo Convention was signed in Tokyo on September 14,
1963. Its purpose was to outlaw acts committed on board air-
craft that may jeopardize the safety of persons on board or their
property,4 8 and it was the first convention to assert formal inter-
national control over the criminal acts of hijackers.
them to the country for prosecution. It gives the aircraft commander the author-
ity to deal with persons who had committed, who possibly conspired to commit,
or were about to commit a crime that would jeopardize the safety of passengers
and the aircraft. The commander may use reasonable force to apprehend the
terrorist, without fear of a civil suit. The Convention sets out the duties and re-
sponsibilities of contracting states where an aircraft lands. It gives authority to
the state's authorities over offenders who disembark in that state, and it requires
contracting states to cooperate and hand over offenders. The commander can
authorize the assistance of the crew and passengers to take reasonable preventive
measures where they have reasonable grounds in an emergency situation; anyone
so acting is given immunity from prosecution if they acted under Article 10. The
failure to provide mandatory extradition, if prosecution was not conducted, was
one of its major weaknesses.
- See Dempsey, supra note 41, at 428.
45 See id. at 429.
46 Id.
47 See id. at 430.
48 See id. at 432 (citing Tokyo Convention, supra note 42, art. 1 (b)).
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The Tokyo Convention applies to offenses "committed or acts
done by a person on board any aircraft registered in a Con-
tracting State, while that aircraft is in flight or on the surface of
the high seas or any other area outside the territory of any
State."49 Jurisdiction is contracted under Article 3, which pro-
vides that the State of registration of the aircraft is competent to
exercise jurisdiction over offenses and acts committed on board.
The Tokyo Convention also seeks to preserve criminal jurisdic-
tion under national law.5 ° The Convention gives to the aircraft
commander specified powers that, in certain circumstances,
when he has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has
committed, or is about to commit, on board the aircraft, an of-
fence [he may] impose upon such person reasonable measures
including restraint which are necessary: (a) to protect the safety
of the aircraft, or of persons or property therein; or (b) to main-
tain good order and discipline on board .... 51
The Tokyo Convention authorizes each contracting state to
take measures establishing its jurisdiction over offenses commit-
ted in the territory of that state, over offenses committed against
or on board an aircraft registered in that state, and in situations
in which the aircraft lands in its territory with the alleged of-
fender still on board. Under Article 7, when the state does not
seek to extradite the offender, though hijacking is an extradita-
ble offense, it is required to submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution.52 Disputes arising
under the provisions of the Tokyo Convention shall be resolved
by negotiation, arbitration, or through the International Court
of Justice.
States are not obliged, however, to exercise jurisdiction over
or to extradite those offenders. The states' only affirmative duty
is to help the aircraft commander; there is no duty to punish the
offenders.53
Dempsey points out that one of the weaknesses of the Con-
vention is its failure to create a definitive obligation on behalf of
all of its signatories, either to prosecute or to extradite the ac-
cused. He suggests the involved nation need only institute a
criminal or extradition proceeding, but not consummate it.54 In
49 Tokyo Convention, supra note 42, art. 1(2).
50 See id. art. 3(3).
51 Id. art. 6.
52 See id. art. 7.
53 See Dempsey, supra note 41, at 437.
54 See id. at 432.
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other words, the Convention has succeeded in identifying the
problems that threaten the security of international aircraft, but
it has been criticized for not providing a satisfactory framework
for resolving the problems.5
B. THE HAGUE CONVENTION (1970)56
In 1970, the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), concerned with the increase in aerial terrorism inci-
dents during the late 1960s, sought to introduce a new Conven-
tion that would clearly define unlawful acts against aircraft as
well as impose more appropriate penalties. Article 1 of the
Hague Convention 57 states that
[a] ny person who on board an aircraft in flight: (a) unlawfully,
by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation
seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or attempts to per-
form any such act, or (b) is an accomplice of a person who per-
forms or attempts to perform any such act-commits an offence
and under Article 2 is subject to severe penalties.58 The effect of
this provision was to declare clearly for the first time that the
hijacking of an aircraft is an international crime.
Dempsey notes that the Hague Convention creates a clear
legal policy and enforcement procedure to deal with it.59 By
providing mandatory jurisdiction or extradition, the Hague
55 See id. at 434; see also NicoLxs MATTE, TREATISE ON AIR-AERONAUTICAL LAW
353 (1981); Ruben Kraiem, Recent Developments, International Terrorism: Hi-
jacking 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1037, 1040 (1978).
56 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
International Conference on Air Law, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 10 I.L.M.
133 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
57 Seventy-seven states originally adopted the Hague Convention on December
1, 1970. This convention made hijacking aircraft in flight a distinct offense call-
ing for severe punishment of any person who hijacked an aircraft. Each state
makes the offense punishable by severe penalties, but not necessarily the extradi-
tion of the offender. The Hague Convention did not deal with offenses commit-
ted on the ground, by sabotage, or by someone not on board the aircraft but who
had placed a bomb on the plane to be operated by a remote control device. The
Convention's drafters limited its scope to only acts committed when the plane's
external doors are closed. Hijackings initiated before the closing of doors on
embarkation, or after the opening of the doors during disembarkation, were not
covered by the Convention. The Hague Convention also required the state to
take jurisdiction over the aircraft, but did not provide for the state to prosecute
the offender.
58 Hague Convention, supra note 56, arts. 1, 2.
59 See Dempsey, supra note 41, at 435.
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Convention seeks to encourage states to initiate criminal pro-
ceedings against hijackers. Article 6 states that the
Contracting State in the territory of which the offender or al-
leged offender is present, shall take him into custody or take
other measures to ensure his presence. The custody and other
measures shall be as provided in the law of that State but may
only be continued for such time as is necessary to enable any
criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted.60
Furthermore, Article 6(2) requires a state to "immediately
make a preliminary inquiry into the facts."' These provisions
encourage states to initiate criminal proceedings under their
own domestic laws against hijackers. The apparent weakness of
the Hague Convention is its failure to provide a uniform system
of prosecution, leaving it to the vagaries of a country's local laws
to provide sanctions. Nevertheless, as Dempsey points out, the
effect of the Hague Convention is to act as a deterrent. Since
prosecution or extradition became mandatory, fewer states are
available as safe havens. Algeria, Lebanon, Syria, and Libya are
the exceptions. Moreover, the Convention enhanced interna-
tional law regarding enforcement of penalties against
hijackers.62
C. THE MONTREAL CONVENTION (1971)63
A third convention criminalizing hijacking occurred only a
year later with the Montreal Convention of 1971, which was rati-
fied by over 128 states.64 The Convention "makes punishable
'by severe penalties' an 'act of violence against a person on
board an aircraft in flight if that act is likely to endanger the
60 Hague Convention, supra note 56, art. 6.
61 Id.
62 See id., art. 2; see also Dempsey, supra note 41, at 443 n.83.
63 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 10 I.L.M. 115 [hereinafter Montreal
Convention].
64 The Montreal Convention defined aircraft in service (as opposed to aircraft
in flight) with a broad definition to take account of pre-flight preparation by
ground personnel or crew as well as a 24-hour period after the landing. It cov-
ered bombings or the discharge of weapons against aircraft on the ground (e.g.,
in the hangar or parking area) whether by a person on board or outside the
aircraft as well as acts against the aircraft in flight, which might also include a
stopover or night stop in another country. The Montreal Convention includes
"performing an act of violence in destroying an aircraft in service," or placing a
device or substance that is likely to destroy the aircraft, or using accomplices to
commit acts of violence or destruction. See id. at 1-2.
744
SYDNEY 2000 OLYMPICS
safety of that aircraft.' 65 A state that is a party to the Montreal
Convention is required at a minimum to assist an air pilot to
regain control, return an aircraft to its rightful owner, and hold
an offender while considering prosecution or extradition.66
Dickinson observes that the treaties have also created custom-
ary law that regulates non-state parties and non-state entities.
Over 125 states, including Lebanon, have ratified these treaties.
The controversy concerning types of punishment and excep-
tions to extradition is not an issue unless an international crime
is involved.67 Hijacking is also a criminal act under interna-
tional customary law.
Levitt suggests that the Montreal Convention, like the Hague
Convention, was framed in response to an escalation of terrorist
violence, in particular the bombings of Austrian and Swiss airlin-
ers in the previous year.6 8 Consequently, the United Nations
General Assembly has passed two resolutions condemning hi-
jacking. The UN Resolution on the Forcible Diversion of Civil
Aircraft in Flight passed on December 12, 1969, by a 77-2 vote,
with 17 abstentions. The UN Resolution on Aerial Hijacking or
Interference with Civil Air Travel, adopted on November 25,
1970, by 105-0 vote, with 8 abstentions, condemns all acts of ae-
rial hijacking and the taking of hostages from aircraft.6 9
D. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION (1977)70
The European Convention 71 was passed following a series of
unsuccessful resolutions between 1970-1976 in which ICAO at-
tempted to strengthen the provisions of the existing conven-
tions, particularly in relation to the apprehension of suspected
65 Karen Dickinson, United States v. ?-International Responsibility for the Hi-
jacking of TWA Flight 847, 19 ARiz. ST. L.J. 325, 339 (1987) (quoting Montreal
Convention, supra note 63).
66 See id. at 340.
67 See Geoffrey M. Levitt, The International Legal Response to Terrorism: A Reevalu-
ation, 60 U. COLO. L. Riv. 533 (1989).
68 See id. at 542.
69 See Dickinson, supra note 65, at 327.
70 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1972, 15
I.L.M. 1272 [hereinafter European Convention].
71 This agreement was made outside ICAO (the International Commercial Air-
line Organization, based in Montreal, Canada) with 14 western nations and Ja-
pan. The intent was to impose sanctions on states that failed to return hijacked
aircraft or failed to extradite or prosecute hijackers. A major weakness was that
only a small number of states signed it. The agreement did not authorize collec-
tive action and most states placed reservations on the agreement. Finally, there
were no enforcement procedures except arbitration.
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aerial terrorists and their activities. Political factors played a
part in the failure of ICAO to successfully create a new conven-
tion. This was due to certain states providing safe havens for
offenders.72
For the same reason, political differences were the primary
cause of the ICAO's inability to draft and adopt a rigorous air
security enforcement agreement. Consequently, two new secur-
ity agreements were initiated and drafted outside the ICAO dur-
ing 1976: the European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism of 1977 and the Bonn Declaration of Hijacking of
1978. Six western nations andJapan wished to impose sanctions
on any state that failed to return hijacked aircraft or failed to
extradite or prosecute offenders.73
Dempsey notes that as early as September 1970, the Consulta-
tive Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted resolutions and
recommendations calling for a common agreement on sanc-
tions to be taken against states providing sanctuary to air pi-
74rates. But it was not until late 1976 that the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe, then consisting of fourteen
countries, finally adopted the European Convention. The weak-
ness of the Convention, in Dempsey's view, is that a country
could refuse extradition if it had "substantial grounds for believ-
ing" that the alleged offender was being prosecuted for his polit-
ical opinions. 75 The European Convention had limited impact
because few states were signatories. It failed to authorize collec-
tive action by member states, contained rights of reservation by
any state which chose to do so, and had no coercive power other
than arbitration.76
E. THE BONN DECLARATION (1978) 77
During the Bonn Economic Summit in July, 1978, heads of
state and government representatives, known as the G7, issued a
joint declaration-the Bonn Declaration on Hijacking. 7 From
72 See Dempsey, supra note 41, at 443.
73 See id. The countries included Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The United States was
not a party. See id. at 445 n.88.
74 See id.
75 Id. at 445.
76 See id. at 446.
77 The Bonn Agreement on Hijacking of 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1285 (1985).
78 See Dempsey, supra note 41, at 446. The Declaration aimed to combat inter-
national terrorism by requiring states to hand over terrorists. Where a state re-
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its title, it is apparent that the agreement is not a treaty, nor did
it create legal rights or obligations between the parties. 9 But
the Declaration's objective was to resolve to take legal action
against any state that fails to respond to a hijacking. The sanc-
tions have been employed on only two occasions.80 Busuttil
comments that the Declaration does not deal directly with hi-
jackers, but is directed toward a state that finds a hijacker or
hijacked aircraft within its territory."'
The Bonn Declaration incorporates the provisions of the
Hague Convention and requires the extradition of the offender
or submission to the domestic authorities for prosecution of a
hijacker found within a state's territory. Similarly, the Bonn
Declaration requires the return of any hijacked aircraft to the
persons lawfully entitled to possession. The Declaration is di-
rected at states that refuse extradition or prosecution of those
who have hijacked an aircraft or do not return such aircraft.8 2
Abeyratne has observed that the aerial boycott adopted by the
Bonn Declaration is not permissible according to international
law as incorporated into the Charter of the United Nations.
Abeyratne further suggests that "States will be held responsible
for a boycott instituted directly by their governments if such
measure is found by the international community to be ultra
vires the established norms of international law."8
fused to hand over a terrorist, other states could take immediate action. For
example, they could cease all flights to that country or suspend all incoming
flights from that country. This strategy amounts to an economic boycott or a
reprisal action. The Bonn Declaration recognized that some states may act as
accomplices and give refuge or safe havens to hijackers, e.g., Algeria, Libya, Syria,
and Lebanon. See id. at 443 n.83.
79 See id.
80 See id. Dempsey points out that the legal issues raised by the possible use of
the sanctions under the Bonn Declaration seem to assume the obligations set out
in the Tokyo Convention and Hague Convention to return hijacked aircraft and
extradite or prosecute hijackers form part of customary international law binding
on all states. But Dempsey also notes that, at least as of 1987, one-third of the
world community has yet to ratify those conventions. See id.
See also Kevin Chamberlain, Collective Suspension of Air Services with States Which
Harbour Hijackers, 32 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 616 (1983); Comment, Skyjacking and the
Bonn Declaration of 1978: Sanctions Applicable to Recalcitrant Nations, 10 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 123 (1980); Dempsey, supra note 41, at 447-48; Fitzgerald, supra note
40, at 223; JamesJ. Busuttil, The Bonn Declaration on International Terrorism: A Non-
Binding Agreement on Aircraft Hijacking, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 474 (1982).
81 See Busuttil, supra note 80, at 477.
82 See id.
83 R.I.R. Abeyratne, Attempts at Ensuring Peace and Security in International Avia-
tion, 24 TRANsp. L.J., 27, 67 (1996).
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While acknowledged as a non-binding international agree-
ment imposing no legal obligations on its signatories, Busuttil
concludes that the Bonn Declaration is a sign to the rest of the
world that the West is serious about curbing and reacting to
hijacking.84
F. THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST THE TAKING OF
HOSTAGES (1979)85
In 1976, the Federal Republic of Germany proposed to the
General Assembly of the United Nations that an international
convention against the taking of hostages be drafted. Conse-
quently, the UN adopted the International Convention Against
the Taking of Hostages in December, 1979. The Convention
defines hostage taking as
seizing or detaining and threatening to kill, injure, or continue
to detain another person (the hostage) in order to compel a
third party to do or abstain from doing any act as a condition for
the release of the hostage. Parties to the Convention must make
the offense punishable by 'appropriate penalties,' which take
into account the 'grave nature' of the offense.86
Furthermore, a state party in whose territory a hostage is held
"shall take all measures it considers appropriate to ease the situ-
ation of the hostage and, in particular, to secure his release. 87
There is a further requirement that the state parties must coop-
erate in the prevention of the taking of hostages. 88
In short, the Bonn Convention obliges the state to establish
jurisdiction over the offenses and to either extradite or prose-
cute the alleged offender.89 The exception to the general rule
occurs when the act of taking hostages is in the course of armed
conflict as defined by the Geneva Convention of 1949. Levitt
observes that despite its national liberation rhetoric, this provi-
sion creates no gap in the legal coverage of the hostages conven-
tion and has over forty signatories representing a fairly broad
segment of the international community.90
84 See Busuttil, supra note 80, at 477.
15 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A1341819 (1979) [hereinafter Bonn Convention].
86 Levitt, supra note 67, at 545-46 (citing McDONALD, THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION AGAINST THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES: THE INSIDE STORY 6 (1983)).





G. THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL (1984)91
The purpose of the Montreal Protocol of 198492 was to amend
the provisions of Article 9 of the Chicago Convention, including
Article 3 bis, which requires that every state refrain from the use
of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in the case of
interception, the lives of persons on board must not be endan-
gered.93 Furthermore, the Chicago Convention requires that
each contracting state take appropriate measures to prohibit the
deliberate use of any civil aircraft registered in that state for any
purpose inconsistent with the aims of the Convention.94
H. THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL (1988)1 5
On February 24, 1988, ICAO introduced a new protocol
aimed at the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports
serving international flights. The purpose of the Montreal Pro-
tocol 96 is to supplement the Montreal Convention of 1971 with
the addition of Article 1 bis.
Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and intention-
ally, using any device, substance or weapon: (a) performs an act
of violence against a person at an airport serving international
civil aviation which causes or is likely to cause serious injury or
death, or (b) destroys or seriously damages the facilities of an
airport ... or disrupts the services of the airport, if such an act
endangers or is likely to endanger safety at that airport.97
The Montreal Protocol also requires, under Article 2 bis, that
each contracting state shall take such measures as may be neces-
sary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses in the case
91 Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International Aviation,
ICAO Doc. 9436 (May 10, 1984). This Convention deals with the lives on board
an aircraft imported by the threat or use of weapons against the aircraft in flight,




95 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, ICAO Doc. 9518 (Feb. 24, 1988) [hereinafter
Montreal Protocol].
96 This protocol deals with the suppression of unlawful violence to persons at
airports. It is concerned with persons committing an offense using a device, sub-
stance, or weapon, or an act of violence against a person, the damaging of facili-
ties at the airport, as well as the endangering of the safety of all persons at the
airport.
97 Montreal Protocol, supra note 95, art. 1 bis.
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where the alleged offender is present in its territory and the
state does not extradite him.98
V. TERRORISM AND AUSTRALIA'S CONCERN WITH THE
SYDNEY 2000 OLYMPICS
This section examines the role of the Australian federal gov-
ernment's security agencies and support services in assessing the
potential for terrorist activities at the time of the 2000 Sydney
Olympics. This section also considers some strategies being im-
plemented to minimize danger to tourists and other visitors
both before and after the Games.
Terrorism may be orchestrated by one of two forms: classic
terrorism and amateur terrorism. Thompson describes classic
terrorism as being carried out by defined organizations that are
full-time, underground, and covert, using traditional methods
and with largely definable motives and purposes.99 Amateur ter-
rorism, on the other hand, is carried out by persons who are not
members of defined groups, have no background in terrorism,
and whose modus operandi cannot be predicted. Thompson
points to recent examples of amateur terrorists' work, including
the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, the use of
nerve gas in the Tokyo subway, the bombing of the Paris Metro,
and the destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City."'"
In contrast, Hoffman highlights the increase in religiously
motivated terrorism groups, stating:
[t]he fact that for the religious terrorist violence inevitably as-
sumes a transcendent purpose and therefore becomes a sacra-
mental or divine duty arguably results in a significant loosening
of the constraints on the commission of mass murder. Religion,
moreover, functions as a legitimizing force sanctioning if not en-
couraging wide scale violence against an almost open-ended cate-
gory of opponents.""'
Thus, amateur religious terrorism may well increase as the
millennium approaches. "Not only will this group include ob-
scure millenarian sects and cults," but in Thompson's view, may
91 See id., art. 2 bis.
99 See Alan Thompson, Introduction, in TERRORISM AND THE 2000 OLYMPics 3
(Alan Thompson ed., 1996).
100 See id.
101 Bruce Hoffman, Targeting Tactics and the Likely Future Trends, in TERRORISM
AND THE 2000 OLYMPIcs 19, 21-22 (Alan Thompson ed., 1996).
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include "a proliferation of Christian fundamentalist, far-right or-
ganisations with a para-military bent.1 °2
Dissident groups and extremists are again active in Australia.
In recent years, the activities of the extreme political right, in-
cluding Ms. Pauline Hanson, the federal member for Oxley in
the Commonwealth Parliament of Australia, who favors restrict-
ing Asian immigration to Australia, has caused dissent, protests,
and violence not seen in Australia since the anti-Vietnam war
protests of the 1960s-70s.103 The Director General of ASIO,
David Sadleir, notes that the neo-Nazi extremists and the racist
right in Australia are also among possible sources of concern,
though they are small in number, politically isolated, and sub-
ject to vigorous police action.10 4
The 2000 Olympics is an international event that will be held
in Sydney, Australia, the country's largest city. While the re-
sponsibility for the organization and funding of the Games is
largely a State responsibility, it requires an international re-
sponse and coordination. Thompson believes that "[t] he Olym-
pics will be the largest event to be staged in Australia's history
and by far the greatest law enforcement/security operation
outside wartime."1 °5 Consequently, only the Commonwealth,
through the Australian Defence Force and the Special Air Ser-
vice Regiment, has the national capacity to deal with a terrorist
incident. 10 6
There is also concern for the role the media will play during
the Olympics because 15,000 journalists and other media repre-
sentatives will be in Australia to cover the events. Indiscriminate
reporting may actually encourage acts of violence. Grabosky
considers that in 2000, Sydney will be the center of the world
stage with an audience in excess of one billion people, where
the opportunity will not be lost on those wishing to make a polit-
ical statement. 10 7
Hoffman describes terrorist groups as mercurial, unpredict-
able, and above all, transnational, highlighting the Aum sect's
102 Thompson, supra note 99, at 4.
103 See L. Lamont, What Asia's Top Business Leaders Think of Hanson, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, July 21, 1996, at 1-2.
104 See David Sadleir, Australia and Terrorism, in TERRORISM AND THE 2000 OLYM-
Pics 43, 47 (Alan Thompson ed., 1996).
105 Thompson, supra note 99, at 5.
106 See id. at 5-6.
107 See Peter Grabosky, Violence in Australian Society, in TERRORISM AND THE 2000
OLYMPICS 49, 59 (Alan Thompson ed., 1996).
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millennialist beliefs, and suggests the world may be "on the cusp
of a new, and potentially more dangerous, era of terrorism as
the year 2000-the literal millennium-approaches."1 °8 The
Aum sect has been active in Japan, Russia, and Australia, where
it was able to conduct experiments and manufacture chemical
nerve gas that was later used in the Tokyo underground railway
against innocent victims.10 9
Over the last twenty-three years and eleven Olympic Games, a
repeat of the Munich incident has been avoided.1 Within this
same time period, both the profile of the Games and the fre-
quency and lethality of terrorism have risen to unprecedented
levels.III At the Moscow Games, security was not an issue, as the
Soviets declared martial law and banished over 120,000 people
from the city. Troops lined the streets and filled significant por-
tions of the stadiums. The KGB also prevented press and for-
eigners from having contact with the Russian people. 1 2 As
Crenshaw observes, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the
dispersion of nuclear materials formerly in the hands of the So-
viet State have provided new resources for potential mass-casu-
alty terrorism."' Moreover, it should be remembered that seven
of the twelve Games held since the Second World War have
been subject to major protests, terrorist threats, actual violence,
or other kinds of political tension or threats, beginning with the
1956 Olympic Games. 14
Olympic security represents a unique and extraordinary se-
curity challenge to the host country in terms of the scale and
cost, the media attention focused on the event, and the diversity
of the participants and the host environment. More impor-
tantly, as Sanan states, "Olympic security requires measures that
are both comprehensive and unobtrusive so that the atmos-
phere of the Games is not spoilt.""' 5
Grabosky observes that the likelihood of the 2000 Olympics
being blighted by political violence "depends less on Australian
history and society than on situational factors in distant
108 Hoffman, supra note 101, at 27.
109 See id.
110 See Guy Sanan, Olympic Security Operations, in TERRORISM AND THE 2000 OLYM-
PIcS 33, 37 (Alan Thompson ed., 1996).
111 See Grabosky, supra note 107, at 59.
112 See id.
113 See Crenshaw, supra note 28, at 126.
114 See David Sadleir, The Role of Intelligence, in TERRORISM AND THE 2000 OLYM-
PICS 113, 119 (Alan Thompson ed., 1996).
115 Sanan, supra note 110, at 41.
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lands." '116 The risk of violence at the 2000 Olympics will "be af-
fected as much by global conditions [in the next two years] as it
will by local circumstances."' 1
7
VI. AUSTRALIA'S NATIONAL ANTI-TERRORIST PLAN
One of the first incidents to usher terrorism into Australia was
the Hilton hotel bombing on February 13, 1978. Prior to this
incident, counter-terrorism was a low priority in Australia. Fol-
lowing the Protective Security Review conducted by Mr. Justice
Hope in 1979, a Standing Advisory Committee on the Common-
wealth-State Cooperation for Protection Against Violence (SAC-
PAV) was established "to provide advice and to coordinate the
development of national capabilities to counter terrorism. 118
An early priority for SAC-PAV was the development of the Na-
tional Anti-Terrorist Plan (NATP) as "the major guiding and
planning document for national counter terrorism
arrangements.' "19
Early versions of NATP included a more succinct definition of
terrorism. The ASIO Amendment Act (1986) amended the def-
inition of terrorism and substituted one of "politically motivated
violence. '1 2° The definition that Australian security forces gen-
erally use is the following: "acts or threats of violence of na-
tional concern, calculated to evoke extreme fear for the purpose
of achieving a political objective in Australia or in a foreign
country." 21
The NATP recognizes the primacy of the police in dealing
with any criminal acts, including terrorist acts.12 2 Each state has
a police service with a separate anti-terrorist plan for managing
terrorist incidents, and the Australian Defence Force has several
contingency plans devoted to counter-terrorism. 21 "The pre-
ventive arrangements set out in the NATP are designed to pro-
vide a secure environment for the Australian community by
enhancing the ability of the agencies to carry out their individ-
116 Grabosky, supra note 107, at 63.
117 Id.
118 Lindsay Hansch, Australia's National Anti-Terrorist Plan: Crisis and the Re-
sponse Arrangements, in TERRORISM AND THE 2000 OLYMPICS 91, 91 (Alan Thomp-
son ed., 1996).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 92.
121 Id.
122 See id. at 93.
123 See id. at 94.
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ual roles through inter-jurisdictional and inter-agency
cooperation."124
The Australian federal government's agencies, security
groups, and Australian airlines acknowledge that while the Syd-
ney 2000 Olympics will be a major generator for tourism in Aus-
tralia, as the time approaches, the country may face increasing
risk of international terrorist activity as both terrorism and
counter-terrorism are becoming increasingly globalized both in
the air and on the ground. 125 Restrictions on freedom of associ-
ation and freedom of movement may be necessary. The use of
sophisticated electronic surveillance devices in streets neighbor-
ing certain venues, and physical checks on entry to large audito-
riums, will no doubt be utilized. 126
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR TOURISM, SECURITY, AND THE
2000 OLYMPICS
Terrorism can affect tourism in two ways. First, terrorist acts
can damage a destination or a country's tourist industry by creat-
ing an image of a lack of safety, as has happened in Egypt in the
last few years. Second, tourists or tourism facilities, such as air-
port terminals or aircraft, can themselves be the subject of at-
tack, as in the case of the 1985 Rome and Vienna airport
incidents.
Australia's security organizations are aware of the continued
trend in incidents around the world involving hijacking and ter-
rorism. The Deputy Director of the General ASIO recently
stated that " [i] n a rapidly changing security environment, events
which occur overseas do not necessarily indicate Australian par-
allels but they offer guidance on what may happen here. 127
The federal government has urged the Sydney Organizing Com-
mittee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) "to lay the ground-
work for a security plan well in advance of the Games. ' 12' The
Head of Security for the Sydney 2000 Olympics, Commander
Paul McKinnon, has confirmed that "threats had been made by
groups within Australia and outside.' 1 29 Notably, the Secretary
124 Id.
125 See THOMPSON, supra note 99, at 9.
126 See George Chin, Private Sector Involvement in Security for Sydney 2000 Olympics,
in TERRORISM AND THE 2000 OL'YMPIcs 189, 192-93 (Alan Thompson ed., 1996).
127 Lague, supra note 11, at 15.
128 Id.
129 Nick Papadoupolous, Olympics Terrorist Threat Revealed, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Feb. 5, 1997, at 4.
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General of Interpol, Mr. Raymond Kendall, on a visit to Austra-
lia in December, 1996, to attend a three day symposium on avia-
tion security, stated that his organization had issued to airlines
and police authorities eighty-seven wanted notices for suspected
terrorists. 130
The response by the Australian Minister for Immigration
highlights the federal government's concern that potential
political or security issues do not arise, even if the response is
criticized by moderates and other more libertarian voices. The
aging Black Panther activist Lorenzo Ervin, who was on a lecture
tour in Australia, was recently forced out of the country when
the Australian government cancelled his visa. The Minister for
Immigration, on learning Ervin was in Australia, took the action
on the grounds that Ervin, who had been convicted years ago
for aerial hijacking and kidnapping, and who had later been
given presidential clemency, was regarded by the Australian gov-
ernment as being unfit to hold a visa; he was therefore swiftly
deported in July, 1997.131
VIII. CONCLUSION
The images of Olympic athletes held hostage by masked ter-
rorists that flashed across the world by television during the
1972 Munich Games is one that must continue to haunt
Olympic officials. The conjunction of dissident forces wishing
to promote their cause at the Games, the athletes participating
in a range of athletic events, and global television with over
three billion people watching the events, creates the potential
for chaos, destruction, and loss of life. It appears, however, that
the Australian government and its security services are ade-
quately prepared for most contingencies under its National
Anti-Terrorist Plan. The Sydney 2000 Olympics and the new
millennium represent an ideal opportunity for the international
community to finally seek more peaceful solutions to conflict in
the future. On this occasion, such an opportunity should not be
lost by nations of the world.
130 See Shanahan, supra note 11, at 5.
131 See id.
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